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New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Zeynep Irfanoglu, Shakun Mago and Roman Sheremeta ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Sequential contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Contrary to this prediction, however, our laboratory study of the three-battle contests shows that sequential contests generate significantly higher expenditure than simultaneous contests. In case of sequential contests, we observe significant over-expenditure in all three battles and find no evidence of the “New Hampshire Effect.” Despite the strategic advantage, winners of the first battle make similar expenditures in the second battle as losers of the first battle. Moreover, instead of decreasing, subjects increase their expenditure in the second battle relative to the first battle. In case of simultaneous contests, subjects do not employ a uniform expenditure strategy and instead use a “guerilla warfare” strategy by focusing on only two of the three battles. We propose several explanations for these findings and discuss some implications.

Keywords: election; sequential contests; simultaneous contests; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2015-08-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Working Paper: The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests (2014) Downloads
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