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Civic capital and support for the welfare state

Roy Cerqueti (), Fabio Sabatini and Marco Ventura ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We model the way the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.

Keywords: welfare state; redistribution; tax surveillance; social trust; civic capital; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H10 H11 H5 H53 Z1 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-pbe and nep-soc
Date: 2016-05-24
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71566