Civic capital and support for the welfare state

Roy Cerqueti, Fabio Sabatini and Marco Ventura

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 2, No 8, 313-336

Abstract: Abstract We model how the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers’ support for the welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2017)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2017)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2017)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01185-7

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