Boundedly Rational Expected Utility Theory
Graham Loomes (),
Andrea Isoni (),
David Butler and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences until the evidence favouring one option satisfies her desired level of confidence. Notwithstanding its EUT core, the model produces patterns of behaviour that violate standard axioms, while at the same time capturing the systematic relationship between choice probabilities, response times and confidence judgments, which is beyond the scope of theories that do not take deliberation into account.
Keywords: Expected utility; bounded rationality; deliberation; probabilistic choice; confidence; response times. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Boundedly rational expected utility theory (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:79893
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