Was Zidane honest or well-informed? How UEFA barely avoided a serious scandal

László Csató

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying is known to violate strategy-proofness. It is proved that a team could be better off by exerting a lower effort: it might be optimal to concede some goals in order to achieve a better position among runners-up, and hence avoid a hazardous play-off. We show that it is not only an irrelevant scenario with a marginal probability since France had an incentive to kick two own goals on its last match against Israel.

Keywords: OR in sport; UEFA Euro 1996; tournament ranking; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82819/1/MPRA_paper_82819.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82889/9/MPRA_paper_82889.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Was Zidane honest or well-informed? How UEFA barely avoided a serious scandal (2018)
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