Was Zidane honest or well-informed? How UEFA barely avoided a serious scandal
LÃ¡szlÃ³ CsatÃ³ ()
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LÃ¡szlÃ³ CsatÃ³: Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA SZTAKI) and Corvinus University of Budapest (BCE)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: László Csató ()
Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 1, 152-158
UEFA European Championship 1996 qualification is known to violate strategy-proofness. It has been proved recently that a team could be better off by exerting a lower effort: it might be optimal to concede some goals in order to achieve a better position among runners-up, and hence avoid a hazardous play-off. We show that it is not only an irrelevant scenario with a marginal probability since France had an incentive to kick two own goals on its last match against Israel.
Keywords: OR in sport; UEFA Euro 1996; ranking; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Was Zidane honest or well-informed? How UEFA barely avoided a serious scandal (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00950
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