Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes

Alex Smolin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A monopolist seller owns an object that has several attributes. A buyer is privately informed about his tastes and uncertain about the attributes. The seller can disclose attribute information to the buyer in a form of a statistical experiment. The seller offers a menu of call options varying in upfront payments, experiments, and strike prices. I study revenue-maximizing menus and show that optimal experiments belong to a simple class of linear disclosures. I fully characterize an optimal menu for a class of single-minded buyers. Surprisingly, the menu is nondiscriminatory and can be implemented by a single partial disclosure followed by a posted price.

Keywords: Attributes; Information Design; Mechanism Design; Private Disclosure; Call Options; Multidimensional Screening; Demand Transformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84132/1/MPRA_paper_84132.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91583/1/MPRA_paper_84132.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91583/8/MPRA_paper_91583.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Disclosure and pricing of attributes (2023)
Working Paper: Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84132

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