On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy

Tilemahos Efthimiadis and Panagiotis Tsintzos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we examine the case of partial central bank transparency and the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. In particular, we establish a relationship between central bank transparency and nominal debt and find that it depends on whether the public has (ex-ante) under or overestimated the preferences of the central banker. Furthermore, we analytically examine the relationship between central bank transparency and central bank conservativeness and find it positive.

Keywords: Central bank transparency; Central bank independence; Nominal debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E58 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
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Published in The Journal of World Economic Review 4.2(2009): pp. 139-153

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84830

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