The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis

Hammad Siddiqi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Hence, sadly, this norm is not likely to go away.

Keywords: Trembling-hand perfection; social norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Journal Article: The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:856

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