The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis

Hammad Siddiqi ()

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 28, issue 13, A0

Abstract: We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Hence, sadly, this norm is not likely to go away.

JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-12
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Working Paper: The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis (2006)
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