The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
María Gómez-Rúa and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.
Keywords: coalition structure; coalitional value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8904
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