The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure

María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.

Keywords: coalition structure; coalitional value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8904

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