The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure

María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 207, issue 2, 795-806

Abstract: We present a unified framework for a broad class of values in transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.

Keywords: Coalition; structure; Coalitional; value; Axiomatic; approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Working Paper: The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:207:y:2010:i:2:p:795-806

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