Experimental Research on Contests
Roman Sheremeta ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review of such studies.
Keywords: Contest; All-pay auction; Tournament; Dynamic Contest; Multi-battle Contest; Multi-dimensional Contest; Group Contest; Rent-seeking; Experiment; Overbidding; Over-dissipation; Incentive Effect; Size Effect; Discouragement Effect; Strategic Momentum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D4 D7 D9 H4 J4 K4 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-law
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89327/1/MPRA_paper_89327.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Experimental Research on Contests (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:89327
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