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Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes?

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Antonio Cabrales (), Guillermo Mateu, Angel Sanchez and Angela Sutan

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or non-alcoholic. To do this, our subjects take part in a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improve the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity in the same context. For all-male groups, we find the same lack of superiority of interaction treatments over no interaction. For all-female groups, some very simple social interactions have a positive impact on trust.

Keywords: negotiation; trust; business meals; social interactions; alcohol. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I18 M11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Working Paper: Does Pre-Play Social Interaction Improve Negotiation Outcomes? (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes? (2018) Downloads
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