Optimal dynamic antitrust fines
Carlos Merino Troncoso
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Standard antitrust optimal fines rely on a microeconomic static model. Motchenkova describes optimal antitrust dynamic sanctions and their application for EU and US methodology. For the EU fine, and based on this methodology, we find an equilibrium point for a high level of offense (2 times normal profits ) and a high detection probability (0.6).
Keywords: antitrust; cartel; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96781/1/MPRA_paper_96781.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:96781
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().