Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information

Gilad Bavly, Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize's location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.

Keywords: search duplication; decentralized research; social welfare; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98838/1/MPRA_paper_98838.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101368/1/MPRA_paper_101368.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102897/1/MPRA_paper_102897.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112774/1/MPRA_paper_112774.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information (2022)
Working Paper: Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98838

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