Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information

Gilad Bavly, Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.

Date: 2020-06, Revised 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2022

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information (2022)
Working Paper: Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2006.14860

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