Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani and Christopher Neilson
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Adam Kapor: Princeton University

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: We study the welfare and human-capital impacts of the configuration of on- and off-platform options in the context of Chile’s centralized higher education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program, and an expansion of the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that more programs’ joining the platform led students to start college sooner and raised the share of students who graduated on time. We then develop a model of college applications, offers, waitlists, and matriculation choices, which we estimate using students’ ranked-ordered applications, on- and off-platform enrollment, and on-time graduation outcomes. When more programs join the platform, welfare increases, and the extent of aftermarket frictions matters less for welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates. High-SES students have greater access to off-platform options, and gains from platform expansion are larger for students from lower-SES backgrounds. Our results indicate that expanding the scope of a higher education platform can have real impacts on welfare and human capital.

Keywords: Chile; On-platform options; Off-platform options; College; Education; Mechanism Design; Off Platform Design; College Admissions; College Enrollment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I20 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://christopherneilson.github.io/work/document ... rm_externalities.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2024)
Working Paper: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2022)
Working Paper: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2022-24

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