Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani and Christopher Neilson

Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 132, issue 7, 2346 - 2395

Abstract: We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/729068 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/729068 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2022)
Working Paper: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2022)
Working Paper: Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729068

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().