Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense

Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman and Emily Owens

Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.

JEL-codes: H44 H76 J15 J33 J38 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense (2021)
Working Paper: Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense (2018)
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