Market Power, Dismissal Threat and Rent Sharing: The Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining
Pedro Portugal and
Working Papers from Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department
One of the predictions of the insider-outsider theory is that wages will be higher in sectors (firms) with high labor adjustment costs/high turnover costs. This prediction is tested empirically in this study, applying an insider-outsider model to a longitudinal panel of large firms in Portugal. The results revealed that firms where insider workers appear to have more bargaining power tend to pay higher wages. In particular, we found that the threat of dismissal acts to weaken insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, to restrain their wage claims. Moreover, the results also showed that real wages are downward rigid in the Portuguese labor market.
JEL-codes: J30 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing: The role of insider and outsider forces in wage bargaining (2008)
Working Paper: Market Power, Dismissal Threat and Rent Sharing: The Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining (2006)
Working Paper: Market Power, Dismissal Threat, and Rent Sharing: the Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w200610
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