Fiscal Institutions and Public Spending Volatility in Europe

Bruno Albuquerque

Working Papers from Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department

Abstract: This work provides empirical evidence for a sizeable, statistically significant negative impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on public spending volatility for a panel of 25 EU countries over the 1980-2007 period. The dependent variable is the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, which does not represent reactions to changes in economic conditions. Our baseline results thus give support to the strengthening of institutions to deal with excessive levels of discretion volatility, as more checks and balances make it harder for governments to change fiscal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy. Our results also show that bigger countries and bigger governments have less public spending volatility. In contrast to previous studies, the political factors do not seem to play a role, with the exception of the Herfindahl index, which suggests that high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending volatility.

JEL-codes: E32 E62 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.bportugal.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/papers/wp201017.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal institutions and public spending volatility in Europe (2012)
Journal Article: Fiscal institutions and public spending volatility in Europe (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w201017

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