Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

David Masclet (), Charles Noussair, Steven Tucker and Marie Claire Villeval

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; BEHAVIOUR; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2001-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (109)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (2003)
Working Paper: Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (2003)
Working Paper: Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (2003)
Working Paper: Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (2002)
Working Paper: Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1141

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