A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms

C.D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera and Daniela Puzzello

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study bilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular, this paper explains why and how various matching mechanisms generate different degrees of information isolation in the economy.

Keywords: Bilateral matching; Frictions; Anonymous trading; Spatial interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 E00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1165

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