A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms

C.D. Aliprantis and Gabriele Camera

No 10, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study ilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular, this paper explains why and how various matching mechanisms generate different degrees of information isolation in the economy

Keywords: spatial interactions; matching; information frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D80 E00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.16621.1070208421.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:10

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