The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson and Roman M. Sheremeta

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic guerilla warfare strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto; conflict resolution; weakest-link; best-shot; multi-dimensional resource allocation; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2010/1256.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The attack and defense of weakest-link networks (2019)
Working Paper: The attack and defense of weakest-link networks (2018)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2017)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2010)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1256

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