Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Luca Corazzini (),
Christopher Cotton () and
No 1412, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs.
Keywords: delegation; threshold public goods; laboratory experiment; fundraising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (2019)
Working Paper: Delegation And Coordination With Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1412
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