Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Luca Corazzini, Christopher Cotton and Tommaso Reggiani ()
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Luca Corazzini: University of Venice “Ca’ Foscari”

Experimental Economics, 2020, vol. 23, issue 4, No 5, 1030-1068

Abstract: Abstract When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Keywords: Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Delegation And Coordination With Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (2023)
Working Paper: Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (2019)
Working Paper: Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6

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