More On Phantom Bidding
Emin Dinlersoz () and
Ruqu Wang ()
No 976, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University
A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following questions are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.
Keywords: Fixed/Flexible Reserve Price; English Auction; Phantom Bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
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Journal Article: More on phantom bidding (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:976
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