More On Phantom Bidding

Parimal Bag, Emin Dinlersoz and Ruqu Wang ()

No 976, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following questions are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.

Keywords: Fixed/Flexible Reserve Price; English Auction; Phantom Bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 1998-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_976.pdf First version 1998 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: More on phantom bidding (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:976

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