More on phantom bidding
Ruqu Wang (),
Emin Dinlersoz () and
Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 3, 707 pages
A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.
Keywords: English auction; Phantom bidding; Fixed/flexible reserve price. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999
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Working Paper: More On Phantom Bidding (1998)
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