Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator

Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

No 670, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.

Keywords: Optimal mechanism; Vickrey auction; Mediator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/sef/media/econ/research/wor ... 2010/items/wp670.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator (2011)
Working Paper: Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:670

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicholas Owen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).