Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011, vol. 29, issue 4, 426-431

Abstract: We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.

Keywords: Optimal; mechanism; Vickrey; auction; Mediator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:426-431

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