Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study

Douglas Davis, Asen Ivanov () and Oleg Korenok

No 728, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject's patience, gender, altruism, and compliance with first-order stochastic dominance have some limited systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject's patience, gender, and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Keywords: Experiment; Repeated game; Individual characteristics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-27
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study (2016)
Journal Article: Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study (2016)
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