Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study

Douglas Davis, Asen Ivanov () and Oleg Korenok

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 1, No 4, 67-99

Abstract: Abstract Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject’s compliance with first-order stochastic dominance as well as, possibly, patience, gender, and altruism have some systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject’s gender as well as, possibly, patience and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate–cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Keywords: Experiment; Repeated game; Individual characteristics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study (2016)
Working Paper: Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9427-7

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