Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?

Michael Kremer and Tom Wilkening

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: 140 countries have adopted bans on exports of antiquities, in part because these are seen as needed to protect cultural heritage for future generations. However, if enforcement is imperfect, export bans may be counterproductive, spurring the growth of a black market trade which can damage objects and obscure the archaeological record. We argue that allowing fixed-duration, long-term leases of antiquities or sales contracts with a pre-arranged repurchase option could achieve most of the goals of export bans while at the same time raising revenue for the source country and improving incentives for maintenance and revelation of antiquities in de facto private hands. While option contracts may be useful in the presence of credit constraints because they shift more revenue forward, leases are optimal mechanisms for resolving hold up and more robustly protect antiquities whenofficials in charge of cultural patrimony may be corrupt.

Date: 2014-01
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Working Paper: Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? (2010)
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