You Owe Me
Ulrike Malmendier and
Klaus M. Schmidt
Additional contact information
Ulrike Malmendier: University of California at Berkeley
Klaus M. Schmidt: University of Munich
No 1, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.
Keywords: gift exchange; externalities; lobbyism; corruption; reciprocity; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 D73 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/discussion_paper/1.pdf First version, 2017-01 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:1
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Series data maintained by Benjamin Langer ().