Obviousness Around the Clock

Yves Breitmoser () and Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
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Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch: HU Berlin and WZB Berlin

No 151, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats to decompose this behavioral improvement into cumulative effects of (1) seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock and (3) getting drop-out information. Li\'s theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2) dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2). However, both (1) and (3) are highly significant.

Date: 2019-04-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Obviousness around the clock (2019)
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