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Obviousness around the clock

Yves Breitmoser and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian

No SP II 2019-203, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats to decompose this behavioral improvement into cumulative effects of (1) seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock and (3) getting drop-out information. Li's theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2) dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2). However, both (1) and (3) are highly significant.

Keywords: strategy proofness; experiments; private value auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
Date: 2019
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