Obviousness around the clock
Yves Breitmoser () and
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Abstract:
Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats to decompose this behavioral improvement into cumulative effects of (1) seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock and (3) getting drop-out information. Li's theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2) dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2). However, both (1) and (3) are highly significant.
Keywords: strategy proofness; experiments; private value auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/195919/1/1663263299.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Obviousness Around the Clock (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019203
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().