Collective Brand Reputation

Volker Nocke and Roland Strausz

No 324, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

Keywords: collective branding; reputation; free-riding; repeated games; imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ipr and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Collective Brand Reputation (2023)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
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