Collective Brand Reputation

Volker Nocke and Roland Strausz

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 1, 1 - 58

Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting trade-off yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2022)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
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