Personalized Fundraising: A Field Experiment on Threshold Matching of Donations
Maja Adena and
Steffen Huck
No 328, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Abstract:
We study a form of threshold matching in fundraising where donations above a certain threshold are topped up with a fixed amount. We show theoretically that threshold matching can induce crowding in if appropriately personalized. In a field experiment, we explore how thresholds should be chosen depending on past donations. The optimal choice of thresholds is rather bold, approximately 75% above past donations. Additionally, we explore how thresholds should be set for new donors as a function of their personal characteristics and demonstrate the benefits of personalization as opposed to setting a general threshold that applies to all recipients of a fundraising call.
Keywords: charitable giving; field experiments; matching donations; personalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D12 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations (2022) 
Working Paper: Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations (2020) 
Working Paper: Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:328
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