Ignorance, Intention and Stochastic Outcomes

Jana Friedrichsen, Katharina Momsen and Stefano Piasenti
Additional contact information
Katharina Momsen: University of Innsbruck
Stefano Piasenti: HU Berlin and DIW

No 330, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

Keywords: information avoidance; dictator game; moral wiggle room; intentions; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes (2022)
Working Paper: Ignorance, Intention and Stochastic Outcomes (2021)
Working Paper: Ignorance, Intention and Stochastic Outcomes (2020)
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