Decomposing Trust
Dirk Engelmann,
Jana Friedrichsen,
Roel van Veldhuizen,
Pauline Vorjohann and
Joachim Winter
Additional contact information
Roel van Veldhuizen: Lund University
Pauline Vorjohann: University of Exeter
Joachim Winter: LMU Munich
No 454, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Abstract:
Trust is an important condition for economic growth and other economic outcomes. Previous studies suggest that the decision to trust is driven by a combination of risk attitudes, distributional preferences, betrayal aversion, and beliefs about the probability of being reciprocated. We compare the results of a binary trust game to the results of a series of control treatments that by design remove the effect of one or more of these components of trust. This allows us to decompose variation in trust behavior into its underlying factors. Our results imply that beliefs are a key driver of trust, and that the additional components only play a role when beliefs about reciprocity are sufficiently optimistic. Our decomposition approach can be applied to other settings where multiple factors that are not mutually independent affect behavior. We discuss its advantages over the more traditional approach of controlling for measures of relevant factors derived from separate tasks in regressions, in particular with respect to measurement error and omitted variable bias.
Keywords: trust; omitted-variable bias; measurement error (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/ ... ussion_paper/454.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:454
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().