A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria\\in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

Juan Escobar and Ulrich Doraszelski
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Ulrich Doraszelski: Harvard

No 453, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008)
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