A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria\\in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

Juan Escobar and Ulrich Doraszelski
Additional contact information
Ulrich Doraszelski: Harvard

No 453, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2008/paper_453.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification (2010)
Working Paper: A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed008:453

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().