A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan Escobar

No 6805, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification.

Keywords: Computation; Dynamic stochastic games; Essentiality; Estimation; Finiteness; Genericity; Markov perfect equilibrium; Purifiability; Regularity; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification (2010)
Working Paper: A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria\\in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008)
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