Economics at your fingertips  

Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies

David Miller and S. Nageeb Ali ()

No 115, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We endogenize social network formation and collective enforcement using a model in which players interact bilaterally and repeatedly along costly links. Cooperation is supported by the threat of collective punishments that spread through the network. Optimal networks are attainable in equilibrium. When the society is homogeneous, the optimal network consists of many separate cliques. Introducing heterogeneous match quality gives rise to more realistic ”small worlds” networks, with connectedness, small distances, and high clustering.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().

Page updated 2021-06-16
Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:115