Repeated Tournaments

Matthew Mitchell and Hugo Hopenhayn
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Hugo Hopenhayn: UCLA

No 1214, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We compute the model numerically to show various possible outcomes. We show solutions where the model eventually leads to relatively equal rewards, and contrast these cases with ones where the long run has persistent differentials. We compute the average reward as a function of the number of prior consecutive successes. This is a measure of the reward as a function of the “gap” between the agent’s histories. Understanding the relationship between the differences between histories of agents and the rewards offered them has been studied by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) in a step-by-step innovation model. Here, we focus on a specific channel by which a planner might want to reward agents differently depending on the history that has been realized.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:1214

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