Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party

Jihong Lee and Qingmin Liu
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Jihong Lee: Birkbeck College University of London
Qingmin Liu: University of Pennsylvania

No 151, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: of reputation building converges to a level strictly between 0 and 1. However, the two limiting cases differ in the number of third party signals invoked.

Date: 2009
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