Bargaining with Deadlines

Andrzej Skrzypacz and William Fuchs

No 159, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study a dynamic model of pre-trial negotiations in which a privately-informed defendant bargains over a possible settlement offer with a plaintiff. We characterize the unique equlibrium limit of a sequence of games as the plaintiff can make more and more frequent offers and discuss under what conditions one can expect a deadline effect - i.e. a positive probability mass of agreement right before the deadline. We discuss connections to the generalized Coase Conjecture.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:159

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