Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

Alberto Martin

No 178, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross-subsidization and separation between different types of entrepreneurs.

Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market (2015)
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Working Paper: Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market (2010)
Working Paper: Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market (2009)
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